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The brain contains ubiquitous reciprocal bottom-up and top-down intercortical and 
thalamocortical pathways. These resonating feedback pathways are suggested to be essential 
for stable learning '~{speech and language codes, and .for enabling context-sensitive selection 
and completion (~f noisy speech sounds and word groupings to occur. Context-sensitive speech 
data, notably data involving interword backward effects in tirne, have been quantitatively 
modeled using these concepts, but have not been modeled by purely feedforward models. 
Word count: 1,181 
Norris et a!. argue that "top-down feedback does not benefit speech recognition" and that "no 
experimental data imply that feedback loops are required for speech recognition. Feedback is 
accordingly unnecessary." They carry this position perhaps as far as it can go, and nicely describe 
how their feedforward MERGE model can explain some data at least as well as the feedback 
TRACE model and the feedforward RACE model. They focus on TRACE as a representative 
feedback model because it is "the main standard bearer of interaction." This is a debatable 
assumption because TRACE has major conceptual and data-predictive problems that are not shared 
by other feedback models (Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997). On the conceptual side, 
TRACE is not a real-time model, cannot self-organize, and experiences a major combinatorial 
explosion. On the data side, TRACE cannot explain a host of data in which backward effects 
contextually alter speech percepts. FLMP also has such problems. Norris et a!. are also selective in 
their choice of psychological and neural data with which to support their thesis, and underplay 
serious conceptual problems with their own model that feedback models have already overcome. 
Massive and selective feedback processes exist in every cortical and thalamic region (Felleman and 
Van Essen, 1991). Norris et a!. are claiming that these processes play no role in speech 
recognition. In fact, neural models have recently suggested how the laminar circuits of neocortex 
merge feedforward, horizontal, and feedback pathways to elegantly achieve three goals: (I) stable 
development of cortical connections and adult learning; (2) seamless fusion of bottom-up and top-
down processing, whereby top-down feedback modulates, matches, and attentively selects bottom-
up data that are consistent with learned top-down hypotheses; and (3) a synthesis of analog 
representation and coherent binding of distributed information that is called analog coherence 
(Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). 
Norris et a!. do not explain how a feedforward model can explain classical phonemic restoration 
data: Let a listener hear a broad-band noise followed rapidly by the words "eel is on the .... " If this 
word string is followed by "orange", then "noise-eel" sounds like "peel"; if by "wagon", it sounds 
like "wheel"; if by "shoe", it sounds like "heel" (Warren, 1984; Warren and Sherman, 1974). If 
some formants of the expected sound are missing from the noise, then only a partial reconstruction 
is heard (Samuel, 198la, 1981 b). If silence replaces the noise, then only silence is heard, and the 
sentence meaning changes, e.g., consider "eel is on the shoe". These results strongly argue that the 
feedforward signal is not what is consciously heard. Instead, contextual feedback from the 
meaning of the entire sentence "feeds backwards in time" across several words to select those noise 
formants that are consistent with a contextually sensitive top-down expectation. This top-down 
matching process cannot, however, "create something out of nothing. It can only select and focus 
attention on what is already in the feedforward data stream. This attentive process can take from 
I 00 to 200 msec. to generate a conscious percept. It demonstrates an intimate interaction between 
lexical and prelexical processes. 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) models explain such data as properties of brain resonances that 
focus attention upon important bottom-up data while stabilizing brain development and learning 
(e.g., Boardman, Cohen, and Grossberg, 1997; Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg, 1978, 
1980, 1986, 1995, 1999b; Grossberg and Stone, 1986). The time scale of conscious speech is 
identified with the time needed for interacting bottom-up and top-down processes to achieve 
resonance. The matching properties help to stabilize brain development and learning. 
There are many other examples of backward effects in time. Repp (1980) studied categorical 
perception of VC-CV syllables. He varied the silence interval between the VC and CV syllables in 
[ib]-[ga] and [ib]-[ba]. If the silence is short enough, then [ib]-[ga] sounds like [iga] and [ib]-[ba] 
sounds like [iba]. Remarkably, the transition from [iba] to [ib ]-[ba] occurs after 100-150 msec 
more silence than the transition from [iga] to [ib]-[ga]. This is a very long interval for a 
feedforward model to bridge. Moreover, whether fusion or separation occurs at a given silence 
interval is context-sensitive. These data have been quantitatively explained by resonant fusion in 
the case of [iba] and resonant reset in the case of [iga] (Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997). 
They illustrate the ART hypotheses that "conscious speech is a resonant wave" and that "silence is 
a temporal discontinuity in the rate with which resonance evolves". 
Repp et al. (1978) varied the silence interval between the words ORA Y CHIP and the fi·icative 
noise duration in CH. They hereby generated percepts of GREAT CHIP, ORA Y SHIP, and 
GREAT SHIP. Remarkably, increasing silence duration transforms ORA Y CHIP into a percept of 
GREAT CHIP, and increasing noise duration can transform it into a percept of GREAT SHIP. 
Why should more silence or more noise in a future word convert a past word ORA Y into GREAT? 
Why should more noise remove the CH from CHIP and attach it to ORA Y to form GREAT, 
leaping over a silent interval to do so, and becoming detached from its contiguous word? These 
effects have also been quantitatively simulated by ART (Grossberg and Myers, 1999). 
The MERGE model shares some key processes with ART, such as competition between activated 
lexical hypotheses, multiple interactive activation cycles, and reset events (Grossberg, 1980; 
Grossberg and Stone, 1986). But MERGE also has serious weaknesses due to its feedforward 
structure. It keeps lexical and prelexical computations independent until they are merged at the 
decision stage. How this scheme can naturally explain the backwards-in-time data above is unclear. 
MERGE's feedforward decision stage is, moreover, not a real-time physical model: "the word 
nodes cannot be permanently connected to the decision nodes ... the connections ... must be built on 
the fly, when the listener is required to make phonemic decisions ... decision nodes ... set up in 
response to a particular experimental situation." This cannot be how the brain works. In addition, 
the MERGE decision stage represents both phonemic and lexical information in a way that can 
"translate the presentations used for lexical access into the representations more suited 
to ... phonemic decision tasks." How and why this should happen is left unclear. 
ART naturally overcomes these problems using evolving spatial patterns of activation across 
working memory items that resonate with a level of list chunks. The list chunks that are learned in 
this way can include phonemic, syllabic, and word representations. The resonant context 
determines which chunks are competitively selected and learned. A Masking Field architecture was 
introduced to represent list chunks of variable length. It explains how phonemic, syllabic, and 
lexical information can coexist at the list chunk level, and how the speech context determines 
whether phonemic or lexical information will dominate (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg, 
1978). Thus, there is no need to generate connections on the fly. This property helps to explain the 
Magic Number 7, word length and superiority effects, the GRAY CHIP percepts, and why 
phonemic decisions may not develop prior to word recognition, among other data. 
In summary, the feedforward MERGE model has not yet solved core problems for which the 
feedback ART model has proposed real-time, neurally-supported, self-organizing, and data-
predictive solutions. 
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